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The length of time which a loan and investment com-
pany may hold real estate "purchased or otherwise acquired
to secure any debts due to it" was extended from 3 years2
to five years.2  The time may be extended in cases of neces-
sity by the department of financial institutions.24
Loan and investment companies are prohibited from
making any new loans or paying any dividends when its re-
serve balance is below the statutory requirement.2 5
Credit Unions-The law requiring that four-fifths of the
members of a credit union give written consent as a condi-
tion precedent to voluntary dissolution was amended by an
act providing that consent by two-thirds of the members shall
be adequate. 2' Other provisions relating to voluntary dissolu-
tion were not altered.
INSURANCE
To view the Indiana insurance legislation in the proper
perspective a short resum6 of past regulation precedes the
discussion of the enactments of the 1947 General Assembly.
Introduction-In 1869, the United States Supreme Court in
Paul v. Virginia,' decided that "issuing a policy of insurance
is not a transaction of commerce.'"2 This decision was re-
affirmed in 18953 and again in 1913.4 Then the "precedent
smashing"5 South-Eastern Underwriters" decision was hand-
ed down. The United States brought an indictment against
certain insurance underwriters under the Sherman Anti-
Trust act." The action was dismissed in the court below on
22. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945) §18-3111.
23. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 135, § 2(d). This time limit accords with that
of Ind. Acts 1947, c. 138, § 2, which applies to Savings Banks.
24. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 135, §2(d).
25. Id. §3. Reserve balance requirements are specified in Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945) §18-3113.
26. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 243, amending Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§18-2226.
1. 8 Wall. 168 (U.S. 1869).
2. Id. at 183.
3. Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895).
4. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913).
5. Sen. Rep. No. 1112, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1944).
6. U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533
(1944); compare Polish National Alliance v. N.L.R.B., 322 U.S.
643 (1944).
7. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§1-2 (1940).
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the ground that the Sherman Act was not applicable since
insurance was not interstate commerce.8 The Supreme Court
reversed. Mr. Justice Black for the majority,9 pointed out
that in deciding whether this vast business was subject to
federal regulation, it was proper to look at the transaction
as a whole and not just the isolated incidents of executing
an insurance contract.10
There was a contention that the South-Eastern decision
invalidated state regulation,11 and left the business of insur-
ance uncontrolled.1 2 This was the line of argument advanced
unsuccessfully by the insurance interests in Robertson v.
California.- The court however upheld the California license
requirement for insurance companies and agents as a valid
exercise of the police power. This decision forcibly illustrated
the veracity of the language of Mr. Justice Black in the South-
Eastern case "that legal formulae devised to uphold state
power cannot uncritically be accepted as trustworthy guides
to determine Congressional power under the Commerce
Clause."' 4
Thus, insurance may not be "within commerce" in order
to validate a state regulation, and yet chameleonically become
subject to federal regulation in a different case. Although
some of the language may seem inconsistent, the pliable Com-
merce Clause 5 is molded to meet contrasting economic needs.26
8. 51 F. Supp. 712 (1943).
9. The decision was four (Black, Douglas, Murphy, Rutlege, J.J.)-
three (Stone, C. J., and Jackson and Frankfurter, J.J.). Since
Roberts and Reed, J.J., did not sit, the decision was by a minority
of the full court.
10. 322 U.S. 533, 541 (1944).
11. Indicative that the states themselves felt that such was the case
is the fact that 35 states (including Indiana) filed briefs in the
South-Eastern case as amici curice in which they urged affirm-
ance of the decision below sustaining the demurrer to the indictment.
12. "The recklessness of such a course (overruling Paul v. Virginia,
8 Wall. 168 (U.S. 1869), is emphasized when we consider that
Congress has not one line of legislation deliberately designed to
take over federal responsibility for this important and compli-
cated enterprise." Mr. Justice Jackson (dissenting), U.S. v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
13. 328 U.S. 440 (1946). For an accurate prediction of both the
Robertson case and the South-Eastern case see Gavit "The Com-
merce Clause" (1932) §162.
14. 322 U.S. 533, 545 (1944).
15. For an analytical discussion of the cases see Gavit, "The Commerce
Clause" (1932) passim.
16. "The history of the Commerce Clause, from the pioneer efforts
of Marshall to our own day, is the history of imposing artificial
19471
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In 1945, in order "that silence on the part of Congress
shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation
or taxation of such business by the several states" the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act 17 was passed. This statute provided
that no Act of Congress should be construed to invalidate any
state action unless "such Act specifically relates to the busi-
ness of insurance."18 Further, it suspended certain parts of
the Sherman Act until January 1, 1948, although acts of
boycott, coercion or intimidation remain subject to the anti-
trust laws.19 The McCarran-Ferguson Act was declared con-
stitutional in the Prudential Insurance Co. case 20 decided in
June, 1946. The test case involved the validity of a Soith
Carolina license tax imposed on foreign-corporation profits
earned within the state. The Court, through Mr. Justice
Rutledge, observed that the McCarran-Ferguson Act "was
a determination by Congress that state taxes, which in its
silence might be held invalid as discriminatory, do not place
on interstate insurance business a burden. "1 The
Court noted that sixteen states, including Indiana,22 had for-
eign life insurance taxes "substantially similar" to the South
Carolina tax in issue. 2
The decision in the Robertson case, validating a broad
exercise of the police power of the state, plus the Prudential
decision, indicate the tremendous responsibility placed upon
our General Assembly, and the legislatures of other states.
Whether insurance shall continue to be regulated by the states
depends to a large extent upon how well our legislative bodies
discharge this responsibility.24
patterns upon the play of economic life whereby an accommodation
is achieved between the interacting concerns of state and nation."
Frankfurter, "The Commerce Clause" (1937) 21.
17. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. (Supp. V.) §§1011-1015 (1946).
18. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. (Supp. V) §1012(b) (1946).
19. 59 Stat. 33 (1945) 15 U.S.C. (Supp. V) §1013 (1946).
20. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
21. Id. at 431.
22. Acts 1935, c. 162, § 235, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940)
§39-4802. See Ops. Att'y Gen. Ind. (1941) p. 361 No. 40.
23. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 431 (1946);
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Indiana, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
24. "Despite continued denial by the Dep't of Justice and Congress
that the ultimate aim is federal control of insurance, the possi-
bility of such control is very real should state regulation fail.
The Senate Judiciary Committee has asked for continuing reports
from the industry upon current progress, thus indicating that
[Vol. 22
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Previous Regulation--The "Indiana Insurance Law" of 1935
is the basic insurance regulation.2 5  This act, as amended,
regulates all domestic, foreign and alien corporations au-
thorized to do insurance business in the state.28  Provision
was made for a Department of Insurance,27 with the powers,
duties, management and control of the Department being
vested in an "Insurance Commissioner" who is appointed by
the Governor.28  The Department exercises limited rule-mak-
ing powers and the rules and regulations which it promul-
gates have the force and effect of law. 29
Insurance has been divided into three classes: Class 1,
Life; Class 2, Casualty and Indemnity; and Class 3, Proper-
ty. 0 Any company may issue policies covering all or any
one of these risks. No insurance company may transact any
business in the state without a certificate of authority from
the Department, nor write any class of insurance not speci-
fied in its certificate.3 1 Certificates are issued for a period
of one year. The Department may examine the affairs of
any insurance company doing business in this state,32 and
the Commissioner has power to revoke or suspend the au-
thorization to do business of any company refusing to permit
examinations. 3  He may also revoke or suspend any certifi-
cate of authority when ny condition prescribed by law for
Congress is still concerned with the business of insurance." Note,
(1947) 41 Ill. L.Rev. 647.
25. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §§39-3201-5032.
26. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-3202.
27. Ind. Acts 1945, c. 351, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945)
§39-3326 which supersedes Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940)
§39-3301. These sections place the Department in charge of the
organization, supervision, regulation, examination, rehabilitation,
liquidation, and/or conservation of all insurance companies to
which this act is applicable and the enforcement, administration
and execution of this act.
28. Ind. Acts 1945, c. 351, §2, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945)
§39-3327 which supersedes Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940)
§39-3302. This section also provides the Commissioner and his as-
sistants shall aid in promoting improvements in insurance laws
and the uniformity thereof in the several states.
29. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-3311.
30. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-3501.
31. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-3324.
32. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-3312. Every domestic
company must be examined at least once every three years. Id.
§39-3313. The Department may accept examination of a company
- by a commissioners' convention or by proper authority of the state
in which a foreign or alien company is domiciled. Id. §39-3316.
33. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-3314.
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the issuance of a certificate ceases to exist. The Department
may bring an action against any insurance company which
does not comply within thirty days with a department order
to discontinue illegal or unsafe practices." The Department
may also under judicial order take possession of the business
and property of any domestic insurance company for the pur-
pose of rehabilitation."s
Foreign or alien insurance companies have the same,
but no greater, rights and privileges than a domestic com-
pany"8 and must procure a certificate of authority to transact
business in this state.3 7 A foreign company must also appoint
in writing, the Insurance Commissioner and his successors
to be its lawful attorney for service of process.38 However,
this provision has been interpreted as authorizing service of
process only on a claim arising on an insurance policy writ-
ten in this state or on a contract entered into with a resident
of Indiana. 9
The basic act, as amended, provided that every fire in-
surance company must maintain or be a member of a rating
bureau4° whose rates must be filed with the Department. 1
34. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-3323. Such action shall
be brought by the attorney-general in the name of the State of
Indiana on relation of the Department of Insurance in the circuit
or superior court of the county in which the insurance company has
its principal place of business.
35. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §§39-3401 et. seq.
36. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4702.
37. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4701. To obtain a cer-
tificate of authority, the foreign company files with the Department
a duly certified copy of its charter, a copy of its constitution, a
statement of its business under oath by president and secretary,
a certificate of the proper official in foreign state that it is
legally organized, must furnish the Deparftment such other informa-
tion asi it deems necessary and must show its assets are invested
in accordance with the laws of the foreign state. Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4704.
38. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4704(h). Power of at-
torney must contain an agreement by the insurance company that
lawful process served on the commissioner shall be of the same
force and validity as i served on the insurance company.
39. General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 222 Ind. 557, 54 N.E. (2d)
944 (1944).
40. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4310 (a),(b). Fire insur-
ance for purposes of this section includes insurance against loss
or damage by fire, lightning, windstorm, sprinkler leakage, use
and occupancy and insurance upon automobiles and other vehicles
against loss or damage by fire and theft.
41. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4310(c). Rating bureaus
are required to file all their rules and regulations.
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The Department was required to pass on all changes in sched-
ules' 2 and, on written complaint of discrimination in rates,
the Department was authorized to order the discrimination
removed.4 3  Insurers of motor vehicles were also required to
file a schedule of rates with the Department.4" These pro-
visions have been repealed and superseded by a comprehensive
scheme of rate regulation discussed infra. The Department
was authorized to prescribe rates, as such, for only one class
of risk-workmen's compensation. 45  These provisions have
been continued by Chapter 75 of the Acts of 1947.
The basic insurance law also provided for regulation of
insurance agents, and these provisions remain unchanged. An
insurance agent must secure a license from the Department."
A sworn statement under oath by the applicant that he is
qualified to act as an agent, is required, and if the Depart-
ment deems it necessary to verify the statement, the appli-
can may be required to show that he is of good business
reputation, reasonably familiar with the insurance laws of the
state, and with the provisions of the policies he proposes to
solicit, and that he has not had a license refused or revoked in
any state.47 A section restricting the solicitation of fire and
casualty insurance to agents selling on a commission basis
only,4s has recently been invalidated. The court held that al-
though an insurance agent is engaged in a business "affected
with a public interest," whether an insurance agent is paid on
salary or on commission has nothing to do with public wel-
fare and has no substantial relation to the police power.' 9
42. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4310 (f). Proposed changes
are submitted in writing by the bureau to the Department. The
Department holds a hearing and makes a finding as to the changes.
Any party in interest that is dissatisfied with the finding of the
Department may within 30 days commence an action in a court
of competent jurisdiction for purpose of reviewing such order.
43. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) 439-4310(k). A hearing is
held to determine the question of discrimination and a dissatisfied
party may have judicial review of the finding.
44. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4310(s).
45. Ind. Acts 1935, c. 323, Ind. Acts 1941, c. 167, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
Repl. 1940) §§39-3005 et seq. See Ops. Att'y Gen. Ind. (1941) p.
427.
46. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4503 (Insurance agents
other than life), §39-4603 (Life insurance agents).
47. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4504 (Insurance agents
other than life). Life insurance agents must include these pro-
visions in a written application to the Commissioner. Id. §39-4603.
48. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4501(a).
49. Dep't of Ins. v. Schoonover, 72 N.E. (2d) 747 (Ind. 1947).
1947] 369
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In short, the previous Indiana legislation has regulated
the insurance business by granting and revoking certificates
of authority to do business in the state, and by prescribing
permissible investments,50 minimum reserves,51 and contract
provisions. 2 The 1947 legislation in the field broadens the
regulation of unfair practices and provides a comprehensive
system of rate regulation.
Unfair Practices-Chapter 112 broadens the regulation of
trade practices in the insurance business in accordance with
Congressional intent as expressed in the McCarran Act.5 3
The Act is expressly stated to be "in addition" to all other
Indiana laws concerning the insurance business, 54 which
have prohibited numerous unfair and illegal practices.5 5 The
Act also preserves all previous criminal penalties as declared
by the Indiana Insurance LawK--its purpose being to provide
additional administrative remedies.5 7
The Act defines six new unfair methods of competition
and unfair and deceptive acts and practices:.'
(1) No person shall make a false entry in or omit a
true entry from any book, report or statement of any insurer
with intent to deceive any lawfully appointed examiner or
any public official to whom the insurer is required to report.,9
(2) No person shall require as a condition precedent
to loaning money upon the security of a mortgage on real
50. See, e.g., Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945) §§39-4202, 4203, 4218(Life Insurance Co.); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §§39-
4303, 4305, 4312 (Casualty, fire & marine).
51. See, e.g., Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945) §39-4208 (Life);
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4311 (Casualty, fire &
marine).
52. See, e.g., Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §§39-4206, 4207,
42-10 (Life); Id. §§39-4306, 4308, 4309 (Casualty, fire &marine);
Id. §39-3005 (Workmen's Compensation).
53. 15 U.S.C. (Supp. V) §§1011-1013 (1946), discussed supra. See
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-3203 for a definition of
the business of insurance.
54. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 112, §18(a).
55. See Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-414, 39-3603, 39-3723,
39-4218, 39-4219, 39-5017, 39-5019, 39-5030.
56. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 112, §4(a). On criminal penalties, see Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §§39-414, 39-3723, 39-4219, 39-5017, 39-
5024, 39-5030(c).
57. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 112, §18(b).
58. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 112, §4(a). The remainder of §4(a) merely
reiterates the unfair practices defined by the Ind. Insurance Law,
thus subjecting them to the newly-provided administrative remedies.
59. Id. §4(a) (5).
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property that-the borrower negotiate any policy of insurance
on the property through a particular insurance agent, but the
lender may still require his approval of the insurance under-
writer chosen by the borrower.60
(3) No person shall give, offer to give, or permit any
rebate or other special advantage, including excessive or in-
adequate charges, upon any policy of insurance.61 But pay-
ing bonuses or otherwise abating premiums out of surplus,
if fair and equitable, giving rebates for savings effected in
making collections, readjusting rates on group insurance
upon the basis of expense experience thereunder, and paying
commissions to duly licensed agents (if not passed on to the
insured by way of rebate) shall not be considered to be "spe-
cial advantages. '1 62(4) No person shall enter any agreement to commit
or by concerted action commit any act of boycott, coercion
or intimidation resulting or tending to result in unreasonable
restraint of, or monopoly in, the business of insurance . 3
(5) No person shall enter into "any contract, combina-
tion in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in
restraint of commerce in the business of insurance.6
4
(6) No person shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize
or conspire with others to monopolize any part of the com-
merce in the business of insurance.6 5
The first three provisions enumerated give rise to no
particularly unusual or difficult legal problems, and they can
be enforced according to their tenor in a more or less routine
fashion. The anti-trust provisions of the act, however, raise
some interesting possibilities.
A statute adopted from another jurisdiction is presumed
to have been adopted with the construction placed upon it
60. Id. §4(a) (9).
61. Id. §4(a) (7) and §4(a) (8) (a).
62. Id. §4(a) (8) (b). Cf. Clayton Act, §2, 15 U.S.C. §13 (1940); Robin-
son-Patman Act, §1(a), 15 U.S.C. §13 1940. But cf. Southgate
Brokerage Co. v. F.T.C., 150 F.(2d) 607 (C.C.A. 4th, 1945);
Great A. & P. Co. v. F.T.C., 106 F.(2d) 667 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1939);
U.S. v. N.Y. Great A. & P. Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946).
63. Id. §4(a)(4).
64. Id. §4(a) (10); cf. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 1940; Ind. Stat.
65. Id. §4(a) (11); cf. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §2 (1940); Ind. Stat.
Ann, (Burns, 1933) §23-117.
19471
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there.66  Since items five and six were copied almost ver-
batim from the Sherman Act,67 federal court decisions should
logically be entitled to great weight in interpreting the pres-
ent Act. Previous Indiana anti-trust laws, however, have not
been generally enforced.68 But it should be noted that prosecu-
tions instituted by the Attorney General under those statutes
were heard de novo in the courts,69 whereas fact determina-
tions under the present Act are to be made by the Insurance
Commissioner, whose findings must be affirmed by the courts
if supported by substantial evidence.70 This procedural modifi-
cation, plus the fact that the Insurance Commissioner is in
much closer contact with the insurance business than the At-
torney General could possibly be with potential defendants
under the previous anti-trust acts, should make for much
more efficient enforcement of this Act. It should further
be noted that this Act provides a penalty only for violation
of a cease and desist order promulgated by the Commissioner,
and not for simply committing an unfair practice. Conse-
quently the Act may not be subject to the strict construction
usually given so-called "penal statutes."71
The provisions of the act relating to administrative pro-
cedure and judicial review72 are largely superseded by the
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act 73 which was passed
66. Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339 (1911); Ward v. State, 188 Ind.
606, 125 N.E. 397 (1919); Bowman v. Conn, 8 Ind. 58 (1856);
In re Russell's Estate, 294 N.Y. 99, 60 N.E. (2d) 823 (1945).
67. 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2 (1941).
68. State, ex rel. Lesh v. Ind. Mfrs. of Dairy Products, 198 Ind. 288,
153 N.E. 499(1926) appears to have been the last effort to enforce
the Ind. anti-trust laws after the fashion of federal enforcement.
But cf. Royer v. State, ex rel. Brown, 63 Ind. App. 123, 112 N.E.
122 (1916), where Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§23-118, 23-119
were strictly enforced by holding that a contractor who had ob-
tained a public works contract by fraud and collusion was not
entitled td payment for work performed thereunder.
69. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §23-102, 23-109, 23-113, 23-119,
23-132.
70. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 364, §18; cf. 3 Sutherland, "Statutory Construc-
tion" §6605.
71. See 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, §407.
72. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 112, §5 et seq.
73. The Uniform Act, with certain specified exceptions, expressly
repeals all prior inconsistent acts Ind. 1947, d. 365, §28, and
acts "passed by this General Assembly, regardless of whether such
Act or Acts were passed before or after the effective date of this
act." Ibid., §30. The validity of the latter section might be doubt-
ful, as applied to subsequently passed acts, but it clearly super-
sedes those previously passed.
[Vol. 22
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and approved after the principal act.74 The Unfair Practices
Act is controlling,75 however, insofar as it provides for ten
days notice before hearing,76 the issuance of a cease and de-
sist order upon a finding that any person has violated any
provision of the act,77 automatic stay of the Commissioner's
order for thirty days upon application for judicial review,78
and for forfeiture of a sum not to exceed two thousand
dollars for each violation of a valid cease and desist order of
the Commissioner or an order of the court.79
Rates. The 1947 General Assembly enacted a comprehensive
system for the regulation of certain insurance rates in In-
diana. Chapter 60 and Chapter 111 purport to promote pub-
lic welfare by regulating insurance rates and authorizing
cooperative action among insurers in rate making. 0 The
acts are not intended to prohibit or discourage reasonable
competition. Uniformity in insurance rates, rating systems,
rating plans or practices is neither prohibited- nor encouraged
except to the extent necessary for regulating excessive, inade-
quate or unfairly discriminatory rates. Chapter 60 applies
to casualty insurance, including fidelity surety and guaranty
bonds, and to all forms of motor vehicle insurance, on risks
or operation in this state.81  Chapter 111 is applicable to
74. The Uniform Act was passed on March 5, 1947; the Unfair Prac-
tics Act was passed on February 20, 1947.
75. Sec. 21 of the Uniform Act provides that that act shall supersede
acts giving authority to particular agencies only to the extent that
they may be in direct conflict.
76. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 112, §§5 (a), 8(a). The Uniform Act provides
only for "at least five days notice." Ind. Acts 1947, c. 365, §6.
77. Id. §6(a). The Uniform Act does not specify the type order which
may be issued by particular agencies.
78. Id. §7(d). The Uniform Act, §13, provides: "This Act shall not
prevent automatic stay of agency action where expressly provided
for by law."
79. Id. §12. No penalties are provided in the Uniform Act.
80. The procedure for rate making, filing of rates, licensing of rating
bureaus, or any provision which affects the insurer only will
not be discussed in detail.
81. The act exempts from its operation the following: (1) Re-insur-
ance; (2) Workmen's Compensation; (3) Accident and health in-
surance; (4) Abstract and title insurance; (5) Insurance against
loss of or damage to aircraft; (6) Insurance against liability aris-
ing out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any aircraft; (7)
Farmers' mutual insurance companies organized and operating
under the farmers' mutual insurance laws of this state. -
As to the exceptions: a discrimination is valid if not arbitrary
and the legislature has wide discretion in fixing classifications.
See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
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fire, marine and inland marine insurance, and allied lines on
risks located in Indiana.82
Under the acts, insurance companies are given permis-
sion to join any rating organization licensed by the Insurance
Department. Membership in such an organization is purely
voluntary; but when the insurer becomes a member, it must
submit to the organization's rules, subject to an appeal to
the Insurance Commissioner. Chapter 269 of the Acts of
1947 specifically provides for certain features of the consti-
tution and by-laws of rating organizations. Rating organiza-
tions are specifically prohibited from adopting rules which
regulate the payment of dividends, savings or unabsorbed
premium deposits to their policy holders, members or sub-
scribers. 3
The insurer, or, if it belongs to a rating organization,
the organization, must make rate filings with the Depart-
ment. Each filing shall be on file for a waiting period of
fifteen days before it becomes effective. The waiting period
may be extended an additional period not to exceed fifteen
days if the Department gives the rating organization or the
insurer written-notice stating that the Department needs ad-
ditional time for consideration of the filing. The Department
shall review filings as soon as reasonably possible after they
have been made to determine that they are not "excessive,
inadequate or unfairly discriminatory."8 4 A filing shall be
deemed approved unless disapproved by the Department with-
in the waiting period or any extension thereof. The Depart-
ment has no authority to disapprove any filing which meets
the requirements of the act-.
It is apparent that the state does not fix rates directly.
82. Chapter 111 specifically repeals Ind. Acts 1935, c. 162, §178, Ind.
Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4310 which provided for com-
pulsory membership of fire insurance companies in rating bureaus.
The following are excluded from the operation of the act: (1)
Reinsurance other than joint reinsurances; (2) Insurance of ves-
sels or craft, their cargoes, marine builders' risks, marine protec-
tion and indemnity, or other risks commonly insured under marine,
as distinguished from inland marine, insurance policies; (3) In-
surance of hulls of aircraft, including accessories and equipment,
or against liability arising out of ownership, maintenance or use
of aircraft; (4) Motor vehicle insurance or insurance against
liability arising out of ownership, maintenance or use of motor
vehicles; (5) Farmers' mutual insurance companies organized and
operating under the farmers' mutual insurance laws of Indiana.
83. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 60, §7, c. 111, §7(c).
84. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 60, §4(a), c. 111, §4(a)2.
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The power to fix rates initially is delegated to the insurer or
the rating organization, but the rates do not become effec-
tive until approval by the Department. Do these sections
come within the constitutional prohibition against the dele-
gation of governmental powers?85
The authority of the legislature to delegate power to pri-
vate persons is a very controversial field.86 In 1901 the
Indiana Supreme Court held that a statute conferring upon
the State Dental Association power to appoint three members
of the State Board of Dental Examiners did not transcend
the constitutional power of the General Assembly even though
the Dental Association was a private corporation.8 7 A fed-
eral court, in construing a Kentucky statute which created a
rating bureau and required each insurer to be a member
thereof, held that the rating bureau was the agent of the
insurance companies which constituted its membership; and
said, " . . . we know of no reason why a statutory provision
requiring that an agreement entered into by insurance com-
panies, calling for an increase in their rates from what they
have theretofore been, which is to be put into effect by a
special agency created by them for that purpose shall, be-
fore they are so put in effect, be filed with a state official,
is not valid."88 The United States Supreme Court upheld a
statute which authorized the American Railway Association to
specify to the Interstate Commerce Commission the standard
height of draw bars for freight cars. 9  In another case the
same court said, " . . . a denial to Congress of the right,
under the Constitution, to delegate the power to determine
some fact or the state of things upon which the enforcement
of its enactment depends would be 'to stop the wheels of gov-
ernment' and bring about confusion, if not paralysis, in the
conduct of the public business." 90 Since the 1947 Acts under
consideration prescribe a standard, provide for approval by
the Insurance Department before a rate becomes effective
and afford adequate review by the courts, it is submitted
85. Ind. Const. Art. IV, §1.
86. For a good discussion pointing out the problems see Jaffe, "Law
Making by Private Groups," (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 201.
87. Overshiner v. State, 156 Ind. 187, 59 N.E. 463 (1901). But see
Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 699, 35 N.E. (2d) 270, 302 (1941).
88. Aetna Fire Insurance Co. v. Shanks, 14 F. (2d) 690, 694 (1926).
89. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281 (1908).
90. Union Bridge Co. v. U.S., 204 U.S. 364, 387 (1907).
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that they do not come within the constitutional prohibition.91
After a filing of rates by an insurer or rating organiza-
tion has become effective, the filing and any supporting in-
formation shall be open to public inspection. Any person
or organization aggrieved by any filing which is in effect
may make written application to the Insurance Department
for a hearing. 2  The application shall specify the grounds
upon which the applicant relies. If the Commissioner finds
that the application is made in good faith, that the applicant
would be aggrieved if his grounds are established, and that
the grounds otherwise justify it, he shall hold a hearing. It
shall be held within thirty days after receipt of the applica-
tion and upon not less than ten days written notice to the
applicant and to every insurer and rating organization which
made the filing. If the Commissioner finds that the filing
does not meet the rate standard, he shall issue an order speci-
fying in what respects he finds the filing deficient. He shall
further state when the filing shall be no longer effective.
Copies of the order shall be sent to the applicant and to the
insurer and rating organization concerned. The order shall
not affect any contract or policy made or issued prior to the
expiration of the period set forth in the order.
Every rating organization and every insurer which makes
its own rates shall furnish to any insured affected all pertin-
ent information as to the rates established. The insurer or
organization must act within a reasonable time after receiv-
ing a written request for the information, and it may make
a reasonable charge for the service.93  Every rating organ-
91. For examples of rating bureau statutes see Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns
Repl. 1940) §39-3008 (Workmen's Compensation); Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, Repl. 1940) §39-4310 (Fire, marine and inland marine),
repealed by Ind. Acts 1947, c. 111.
92. Chapter 60 does not contain an express provision whereby an ag-
grieved person may make application to the Commissioner for a
hearing on any filing in effect. The other provisions for review
of the filinga by the Commissioner for the insured are the same.
Therefore, a later section providing that any insured or person
aggrieved by any order or decision of the Commissioner made
without a hearing may make written request to the Commissioner
for a hearing should give the insured his right to a hearing.
A proviso makes the procedure described here inapplicable to the
insurer or rating organization that made the filing. Quaere: If
the insurer or rating organization that made the filing is the only
exemption, would it be possible for another insurance company
or rating organization to proceed under this section?
93. Permission to charge for the information is not given to the in-
surer or rating organization in Chapter 60.
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ization and every insurer which makes its own rates shall
provide, within Indiana, reasonable means for hearing any
person aggrieved by the application of its rating system.
If the organization or insurer fails to grant or rejects within
thirty days, the insured's written request to review the man-
ner in which the rating system has been applied in connection
with the insurance afforded him, the applicant may proceed
as if his application had been rejected. Any person affected
by the action of the organization or insurer on the request
may, within thirty days after written notice of the action,
appeal to the Department of Insurance. The Commissioner
shall hold a hearing upon not less than ten days notice to the
applicant and to the organization or insurer. He may affirm
or reverse the action taken on the insured's request. This,
in effect, gives the insured an alternative procedure for re-
view of his complaints, i.e. he may go through the rating
organization or insurer to the Commissioner instead of filing
an application directly with the Insurance Department.
Any insured, insurer, rating organization or other party
in interest aggrieved by any order or decision of the Com-
missioner made without a hearing, may, within thirty days
after notice of the order, make written request to the Com-
missioner for a hearing. Within twenty days after receipt
of the request, the Commissioner shall hear the parties. He
shall give not less than ten days written notice of the time
and place of the hearing. The Commissioner is to affirm,
reverse or modify his previbus action within fifteen days
after the hearing.
Any order or decision of the Commissioner is subject to
judicial review in accordance with the 1947 Administrative
Procedure Act.94
The wilful violation of any provision of the act by any
person, rating organization or insurer is deemed a misdemean-
or. The violator, upon conviction, shall be fined not less than
one hundred dollars and not more than five hundred dollars
for each violation. The punishment applies to any person
or organization that wilfully withholds information from, or
knowingly gives false or misleading information to, the Com-
missioner, the Department, any statistical agency designated
by the Department, any rating organization, or any insurer
94. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 365. Discussed herein p. 319.
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which will affect the rates or premium chargeable under the
act.
95
When the Commissioner issues an order disapproving an
effective rate filing, the order is to state in what respects
the filing is deficient and when, within a reasonable time,
the filing shall be deemed no longer effective. The act pro-
vides that the Commissioner's order "shall not affect any
contract or policy made or issued prior to the expiration of
the period set forth in said order." That provision certainly
permits the insurer to contract on the deficient rate base
for a limited time. But, can the new rate filing, after it has
been approved by the Commissioner, be interpreted to govern
contracts made prior to the Commissioner's approval?
The state constitution- as well as the federal constitu-
tion9R 7 prohibits impairment of the obligation of contracts.
It has been stated that a public utility has no vested right
in the continuance of any rate fixed, and that the state may
fix different rates without disturbing vested rights.9 8 It is
said that "all contracts made for services to be furnished
by public utilities must be regarded as made in contemplation
of the regulatory powers of the state and that, when the
state exercises such power by changing rates or conditions
of service, such change does not impair the obligations of
existing contracts, although such contracts must yield to the
changes so made."99 That seems to be the generally accepted
view.100
The United States Supreme Court has advanced a similar
theory and applied it to Building and Loan Association reg-
ulations. It was stated by Mr. Justice Reed that when one
purchases "into an enterprise already regulated in the par-
95. No provision of Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945) §§60-1501'
to 1511 (Administrative Rule-Making Act) shall be construed
to apply to rates or classifications made pursuant to this act and
approved by the Comnmissioner or Department.
96. Ind. Const. Art. I, §24.
97. U.S. Const. Art. I, §10.
98. Central Union Telephone Co. v. Indianapolis Telephone Co., 189
Ind. 210, 219, 126 N.E. 628, 632 (1919).
99. Id. at 227, 126 N.E. at.634.
100. See Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Federal Power Commission,
121 F. (2d) 159, 163 (1941) where the court said, "Having held
the statute a constitutional regulation of 'an industry. . .subject to
control for the public good'. . .it logically follows that contracts
made by petitioner, even though prior to its enactment, are also
subject to regulation in public interest."
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ticular to which he now objects, he purchases subject to fur-
ther legislation upon the same topic."101 (Italics added.) That
case is especially pertinent when applied to contracts of in-
surance made after the Acts of 1947 have taken effect.
It has long been recognized that insurance is subject to
state regulation.10 2 The Supreme Court of Indiana has said
that the business of insurance is "quasi-public in character,
and the right to engage in it is a franchise. '103 The ques-
tion becomes, will the court treat insurance as they have pub-
lic utilities? An insurance contract is controlled by the same
law as any other contract.104 The premium to be paid is
the heart of the contract, 0 5 and Indiana courts protect the
obligation of a valid contract. 0
It is submitted that authority exists to uphold as con-
stitutional an interpretation which would make new rates,
as approved, applicable to prior contracts. That result has
been reached in the regulation of workmen's compensation
insurance rates.1°0 As to contracts made after regvlation of
insurance rates became effective, there would seem to be no
valid constitutional objection. But the Indiana court adheres
to the dogma that if a statute can be construed and applied
so as to avoid a conflict with the constitution, such a con-
struction will be adopted by the court. 08 Therefore, it is
submitted, that since the 1947 legislation does not specifically
make the rates as fixed by the Insurance Commissioner appli-
cable to past contracts of insurance, the acts will be construed
101. Veix v. 6th Ward Bldg. & Loan, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940).
102. It has already been reaffirmed in Indiana that insurance is a
business "affected with the public interest." Department of In-
surance v. Schoonover, 72 N.E. (2d) 747, 749 (Ind. 1947).
103. National Colored Aid Society v. State ex rel. Wilson, 208 Ind.
380, 393, 196 N.E. 240, 246 (1935).
104. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Atterovitz, 214 Ind. 186, 203,
14 N.E. 2d 570, 577 (1938).
105. "The premium is of the very essence of the contract, or, in other
words, the premium paid by the insured and the peril assumed
by the insurer are two correlatives, inseparable from each other,
it being their union which constitutes the essence of the contract."
"Couch On Insurance" §581 (1929).
106. Heath v. Fennig, 219 Ind. 629, 632, 40 N.E. (2d) 329, 331 (1941).
107. The leading case is Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. v. Suc-
cess-Uncle Sam Cone Co., 208 N.Y.S. 510. The court said at
page 512, ". . .the policy of the state (as expressed in the Insur-
and Law) is to remove the matter of rates, premiums, and classifi-
cations from the field of private bargaining and agreement."
108. Heath v. Fennig, 219 Ind. 629, 633, 40 N.E. (2d) 329, 331 (1941).
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as not applicable to contracts of insurance in existence prior
to the effective date of the new rates.
Other New Legislation-Chapter 75 makes the rate standard
of "excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory" appli-
cable to workmen's compensation insurance rates and broad-
ens the Insurance Commissioner's authority in regulation
thereof.
Chapter 269, as mentioned supra, adds a new section to
the Indiana Insurance Law regulating insurance rating bu-
reaus.
Chapter 43 amends the permissible investment statute as
to domestic life insurance companies.
LABOR AND INDUSTRY
Occupational Diseases. Chapter 164 makes a number of
minor changes in the compensation and procedural provisions
of previous statutes. Compensation payable to dependents of
one dying from an occupational disease continues to be the
equivalent of three hundred fifty weeks.1 Dependents are
reclassified into three classes: (1) presumptive, (2) total
in fact, and (3) partial in fact, and each is defined.2  Burial
expenses to be paid by an employer is increased to three hun-
dred dollars.3 The period during which the employer is liable
for treatment, services, and supplies is increased to one hun-
dred eighty days and as long thereafter as the Industrial
1. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 164, § 1, rewords the provisions of Ind. Acts
1945, c. 290, § 1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945) § 40-2207.
2. Id. §§ 2, 3, 4. These classes take exclusively in succession. Cf.
In Re Marshall, 70 N.E. (2d) 772 (Ind. App. 1947). Presumptive
dependents include a wife living with her husband at the time of
his death; a husband both physically and financially incapable of
self-support; an unmarried child under the age of eighteen years,
living with the parent at the time of his death; such child, though
not living with the parent, if the laws of the state impose an ob-
ligation of support; an unmarried child over eighteen years who is
either physically or mentally incapable of his own support, where
the law requires the parent to support the child; and an unmarried
child over eighteen years who is keeping house for and living
with the parent at the time of the parent's death. A common law
marriage relationship is not recognized by the Act unless it has
existed for not less than five years prior to the death of the spouse.
Total and partial dependents in fact must be related to the deceased
employee by blood or marriage and must be actually dependent
upon the employee.
3. Id. § 5. Under the previous statute the burial expense was limit-
ed to $165. Ind. Acts 1945, c. 290, § 1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
Supp. 1945) § 40-2207.
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